

Message Text

SECRET

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5639

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BELGRADE 1832

EXDIS

FOR TRANSMISSION TO THE PRESIDENT, THE WHITE HOUSE

FOR EUR, PLEASE PASS AMB. EAGLEBURGER
FROM AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: CSCE, OCON
SUBJECT: BELGRADE CSCE - PERSONAL REPORT ON CSCE IN CONNECTION
WITH TITO VISIT

1. MR. PRESIDENT, I TRUST IT IS NOT PRESUMPTUOUS OR INAPPROPRIATE
IN LIGHT OF YOUR EXCELLENT PUBLIC STATEMENT TO SEND YOU THIS
SUGGESTED TALKING PAPER IN THE HOPE THAT IT MAY BE HELPFUL IN
ANY DISCUSSION YOU MAY HAVE WITH MARSHAL TITO ON THE SUBJECT
OF CSCE. THIS PAPER IS OF COURSE SUPPLEMENTAL TO OTHER EVAL-
UATIONS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISOR.

2. THE MARSHAL MAY EXPRESS DISAPPOINTMENT THAT IT WAS NOT
POSSIBLE TO AGREE TO A MORE SUBSTANTIVE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT AT
BELGRADE. WE SHARE THIS DISAPPOINTMENT BUT BELIEVE THAT GIVEN
THE RULE OF CONSENSUS AND SOVIET VETO SUCH A DOCUMENT WAS NOT
POSSIBLE AT THE PRESENT TIME. MANY VERY CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS
WERE SUBMITTED TO THE CONFERENCE BUT VERY FEW OBTAINED SOVIET
SUPPORT NECESSARY FOR CONSENSUS TO DEVELOP. IN THE ECONOMIC AND
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COMMERCIAL SECTIONS, IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TO REACH
CERTAIN AGREEMENTS BUT THESE ALONE, IF ADOPTED BY THE CONFERENCE,
WOULD HAVE APPEARED TO BE TOO SELECTIVE FOR INCLUSION IN THE
CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE CONFERENCE
WAS SUCCESSFUL, ABOVE ALL BECAUSE IT SUCCEEDED IN ITS PRIMARY
TASK--TO REVIEW HOW THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED--
AND IT PROVIDED FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE LONG-TERM CSCE

PROCESS BY AGREEING ON THE NEXT MEETING, IN MADRID IN 1980.
THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT CAN BE JUSTLY PROUD OF THE VERY
CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE THE YUGOSLAV DELEGATION AND THE YUGOSLAV
SECRETARIAT PLAYED THROUGHOUT THE CONFERENCE. WE ARE VERY
GRATEFUL FOR THE MANY COURTESIES AND THE WARM HOSPITALITY
EXTENDED TO US BY THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT.

3. THE MARSHAL MAY ALSO EXPRESS DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE CONCLUDING
DOCUMENT MADE NO REFERENCE TO MILITARY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
MEASURES. HIS GOVERNMENT THAT OF ROMANIA HAVE URGED THAT SUCH
MEASURES BE EXPANDED FOR THE OBVIOUS REASON THAT THEY SEEK AS
MUCH PROTECTION FROM SOVIET EXPANSIONISM AS POSSIBLE. WE VIGOROUSLY
SUPPORTED A NUMBER OF PROPOSALS IN THIS AREA. THE SOVIET UNION
TOOK THE VERY FIRM POSITION THAT THERE COULD BE NO SUBSTANTIVE
AGREEMENT ON NEW CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN BELGRADE OF THE
LIMITED PRACTICAL SORT DEALT WITH BY THE FINAL ACT (SUCH AS PRIOR
NOTIFICATION OF SMALLER SCALE MANEUVERS OR OF MAJOR TROOP
MOVEMENTS.) THE SOVIETS URGED "SPECIAL CONSULTATIONS" TO CONSIDER
ALL PROPOSALS IN THE SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT FIELD, IN WHICH
THEY EXPLICITLY INCLUDED BROAD GENERAL TOPICS INVOLVING SUCH
MATTERS AS THE NEUTRON BOMB, NON-FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
AND A FREEZE ON MILITARY ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP. WE AND MANY OTHERS
REGARDED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO BE MERELY PROPAGANDISTIC AND
DESIGNED TO PRECLUDE SERIOUS NEGOTIATION OF PRACTICAL MEASURES.
WHEN NO SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED ON SUCH MEASURES
DUE AGAIN TO SOVIET OPPOSITION THE YUGOSLAVS LOBBIED FOR THE
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CREATION OF AN EXPERTS GROUP TO FURTHER CONSIDER CONFIDENCE
BUILDING AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES. MANY OF THE PARTICIPATING
STATES, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES, WERE OPPOSED IN PRINCIPLE
TO ANOTHER EXPERTS GROUP, PARTICULARLY IF IT WERE NOT BALANCED
BY AN EXPERTS GROUP IN THE HUMANITARIAN FIELD. AGAIN, THE SOVIET
UNION AND ITS ALLIES WOULD NOT GIVE CONSENSUS TO SUCH AN EXPERT
GROUP. ALSO IT CONTINUES TO BE OUR BELIEF AND THAT OF OUR ALLIES
THAT IF NO AGREEMENT ON PRACTICAL CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES,
EVEN ON PRINCIPLE, COULD BE ACHIEVED IN BELGRADE, THERE WAS
NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT A GROUP OF EXPERTS WOULD DO BETTER.
WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT GENERAL QUESTIONS OF ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT ARE ALREADY BEING DEALT WITH IN OTHER MORE
APPROPRIATE FORA INCLUDING DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS UNDER
UNITED NATIONS AUSPICES IN WHICH YUGOSLAVIA PARTICIPATES.

4. TITO MAY ALSO INQUIRE WHY THE DRAFT CONCLUDING DOCUMENT WHICH
WAS CIRCULATED INFORMALLY BY THE YUGOSLAV DELEGATION ON FEBRUARY
23 WAS NOT RECEIVED WITH GREATER ENTHUSIASM BY THE UNITED STATES
AND ITS ALLIES. THIS PAPER WAS A LAST-DITCH ATTEMPT TO REACH
AGREEMENT ON A SHORT, SUBSTANTIVE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT AFTER THE
SOVIETS SCUTTLED NEGOTIATIONS ON A COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL PUT
FORWARD ON FEBRUARY 1 BY THE NINE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED

STATES, INCLUDING YUGOSLAVIA. THE U.S. SUPPORTED THE EARLIER INITIATIVE. OUR ALLIES AND SEVERAL OF THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES COULD NOT SUPPORT THE LATER YUGOSLAV EFFORT BECAUSE THE YUGOSLAV TEXT WAS SUBSTANTIALLY UNBALANCED BECAUSE, AMONG OTHER THINGS, IT IGNORED HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN CONTACTS ISSUES. TO BE ACCEPTABLE, THAT TEXT WOULD HAVE HAD TO HAVE BALANCE RESTORED BY THE ADDITION OF THIS AND OTHER POINTS OF BASIC INTEREST TO THE WEST. FURTHERMORE, WE AND OUR ALLIES BELIEVED THAT ANY CONCLUDING DOCUMENT HAD TO REFLECT IN A FAIR AND OBJECTIVE WAY WHAT HAD OCCURRED AT BELGRADE. IT WAS OUR OPINION THAT THE YUGOSLAV DRAFT DID NOT SPELL THIS OUT WITH SUFFICIENT CLARITY. NEVERTHELESS, THE YUGOSLAV EFFORT ALTHOUGH NOT ACCEPTABLE WAS RECOGNIZED AS A SINCERE ATTEMPT TO EXPEDITE THE NEGOTIATIONS. THW WORK OF AMBASSADOR MILORAD
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PESIC (PES-ITCH) AND HIS DEPUTY, PROFESSOR ACIMOVIC (ATCH-IM-OVITCH) HAS BEEN GREATLY APPRECIATED AND PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED AT THE MEETING BY AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG AND MEMBERS OF THE U.S. DELEGATION.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED TO WHITE HOUSE.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BELGRADE 1832

EXDIS

FOR TRANSMISSION TO THE PRESIDENT, THE WHITE HOUSE

FOR EUR, PLEASE PASS AMB. EAGLEBURGER
FROM AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG

5. THE MARSHAL MAY ALSO INDICATE UNHAPPINESS THAT AT THE END OF THE MEETING THE NATO AND WARSAW PACT DELEGATIONS ARE IN EFFECT WORKING TOGETHER ON BEHALF OF THE DOCUMENT THAT WE EXPECT ULTIMATELY TO BE ADOPTED. THERE HAS BEEN NO SUPERPOWER CONDOMINIUM AT WORK IN BELGRADE. WE BECAUSE OF THE RULE OF CONSENSUS CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THOSE FEW THINGS TO WHICH CONSENSUS WAS POSSIBLE AND TO MAINTAIN THE PROCESS. I MADE A COMMITMENT TO THE YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR, HOWEVER, TO TRY TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT FROM OUR ALLIES AND FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR FOR AN ADDITIONAL PARAGRAPH ON DETENTE DEEMED HIGHLY IMPORTANT BY YUGOSLAVIA AND THE OTHER EASTERN COUNTRIES. AFTER CONSIDERABLE EFFORT, I OBTAINED SUCH AGREEMENT AND THIS PARAGRAPH IS INCLUDED IN THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT TABLED FOR ADOPTION BY THE MEETING ON MONDAY.

6. WE HOPE THAT THE MARSHAL SHARES OUR BELIEF THAT THE BELGRADE MEETING WAS, NOTWITHSTANDING, LARGELY SUCCESSFUL. THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS TO REVIEW IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS AND THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED. A PRECEDENT WAS
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ESTABLISHED WHICH PROVED THE CREDIBILITY OF THE CSCE REVIEW PROCESS AND WHICH WILL CONTINUE IN THE PERIOD AFTER THE BELGRADE MEETING. THE RECORD OF THE PAST TWO YEARS WAS CAREFULLY EXAMINED AND THOSE WITH POOR IMPLEMENTATION RECORDS WERE IDENTIFIED. ALSO WE WERE ABLE TO ARRANGE FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE CSCE PROCESS BY AGREEING TO MEET AGAIN IN MADRID IN 1980.

7. NO DELEGATION WILL LEAVE BELGRADE COMPLETELY SATISFIED. WE AND OUR ALLIES HAD HOPED THAT CERTAIN NEW PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO EXPAND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT COULD BE ACCEPTED. THESE PROPOSALS CONSTITUTED A CAREFULLY BALANCED PACKAGE COVERING ALL AREAS OF THE FINAL ACT AND RECEIVED THE SUPPORT OF A VAST MAJORITY OF OTHER DELEGATIONS. WE HAD HOPED FOR AN EXPLICIT COMMITMENT TO IMPROVEMENT IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLE AND THE RECOGNITION THAT INDIVIDUALS HAVE THE RIGHT TO ASSIST GOVERNMENTS IN THE TASK OF FULL IMPLEMENTATION.

8. ALSO WE WOULD HAVE FAVORED PROPOSALS IN THE ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL FIELDS THAT WOULD HAVE IMPROVED OPPORTUNITIES FOR EAST-WEST BUSINESS CONTACTS, EXPANDED THE FLOW OF COMMERCIAL INFORMATION, FACILITATED DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN SCIENTISTS AND OTHER SUCH MATTERS. IN THE FIELD OF CONFIDENCE BUILDING, WE SOUGHT NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND NOTIFICATION OF SMALLER MANEUVERS INVOLVING MORE THAN 10,000 TROOPS, MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR TREATMENT OF OBSERVERS, AND OPENNESS ABOUT MILITARY BUDGETS. WE WOULD ALSO HAVE SUPPORTED FURTHER MEASURES TO ASSURE

PROGRESS IN THE FIELDS OF INFORMATION; MORE SPECIFICALLY WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE SEEN IMPROVEMENT IN THE PROVISIONS REGARDING REUNIFICATION OF FAMILIES, MARRIAGES BETWEEN CITIZENS OF DIFFERENT STATES, FAMILY REUNIONS AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF DEEP CONCERN BY PERSONS. SIMILARLY, WE WOULD HAVE LIKED TO SEE FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN THE CIRCULATION OF ACCESS TO AND EXCHANGE OF
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INFORMATION AS WELL AS FACILITATION, IN ALL ASPECTS OF THE WORK OF FOREIGN JOURNALISTS. THE SIMPLE FACT IS THAT THE SOVIET UNION VETOED THESE PROPOSALS, MANY OF WHICH WERE ACCEPTABLE TO YUGOSLAVIA. BUT WE MUST REALIZE THAT WE ARE STILL AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CSCE PROCESS AND THAT ROME WAS NOT BUILT IN ONE DAY. THE ULTIMATE RESULT OF THE BELGRADE MEETING IS THAT THE PROCESS WILL CONTINUE AT MADRID AND THEREAFTER. YUGOSLAVIA AND THE UNITED STATES CAN TAKE SATISFACTION THAT THEIR COMMON EFFORTS AT BELGRADE HAVE ENSURED THIS RESULT.

GOLDBERG

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED TO WHITE HOUSE.

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